Wednesday, November 2, 2016

Najib consigns the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) to the dustbin of history,and Malaysia with it.

by Ganesh Sahathevan


Malaysia's Prime Minister Najib Razak inspects honour guards during a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, China, November 1, 2016. REUTERS/Jason Lee

Najib asks West to stop 'lecturing' as Malaysia embraces China
Out of China comes news from Reuters  that Malaysia's PM Najib has formed a new defence alliance with China and in the process warned  "the West" and in particular former "colonial masters", to stop interfering in the affairs of their former client states.
Najib is reported to have said: 

“More generally, we believe it is incumbent upon larger countries to treat smaller ones fairly. And this includes former colonial powers. It is not for them to lecture countries they once exploited on how to conduct their own internal affairs today.
“Malaysia and China are united in agreeing on the need to defend the sovereignty of the nation state and in the belief that the individual histories, values and governance systems of different countries must be respected,”
This statement  is  at odds with reports from just six months ago about efforts by the Malaysian Defence Minister,Hishamuddin Onn (Najib's cousin) to "push back" China's intrusion into the South China Sea, with Australia's assistance:
"If the reports we've received from various sources regarding the build-up and placement of military assets in the Spratlys are true – this forces us in a pushback against China" 

Australia is a natural military ally,given the 1971  Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) between  Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, the UK (Malaysia's former colonial master) and New Zealand .

In June 2015 the UK Parliament was told

Under the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, the five powers (Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the UK) are to consult each other "immediately" in the event or threat of an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in response. There is no specific commitment to intervene militarily. The Five Powers Defence Arrangements do not refer to exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and the enforcement of a state's EEZ rights is a matter for that state; a state may request the assistance of other states in so doing.


Najib has effectively told the other parties to the FPDA that he will from here on go it alone with China .The Arrangements under the FPDA described below are rendered meaningless when one party to the Arrangement, in this case Malaysia, agrees to submit and succumb to China's intrusion into its and adjoining international waters, in defiance of international law. The FPDA is dead
In the process Najib has made Malaysia a strategically irrelevant  state.Other parties will have to be relied on by the international community to secure passage via the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.
END 


Five Power Defence Arrangements

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Five Power Defence Arrangements member nations
The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) are a series of defence relationships established by a series of multi-lateral agreements between the United KingdomAustraliaNew ZealandMalaysia and Singapore (all Commonwealthmembers) signed in 1971, whereby the five powers are to consult each other "immediately" in the event or threat of an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in response. There is no specific commitment to intervene militarily. The Five Powers Defence Arrangements do not refer to exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and the enforcement of a state's EEZ rights is a matter for that state; a state may request the assistance of other states in so doing.[1]

Origins[edit]

The FPDA was set up following the termination of the United Kingdom's defence guarantees of Malaysia and Singapore under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement, as a result of the UK's decision in 1967 to withdraw its armed forces east of Suez. Under the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, the five powers (Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the UK) are to consult each other "immediately" in the event or threat of an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in response. There is no specific commitment to intervene militarily."[2] The FPDA provides defence co-operation between the countries, establishing an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) for Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore based at RMAF Butterworth under the command of an Australian Air Vice-Marshal (2-star). RMAF Butterworth, was under the control of the Royal Australian Air Force until 1988, and is now run by the Royal Malaysian Air Force but hosts rotating detachments of aircraft and personnel from all five countries.
In 1981, the five powers organised the first annual land and naval exercises. Since 1997, the naval and air exercises have been combined. In 2001, HQ IADS was redesignated Headquarters Integrated "Area" Defence System. It now has personnel from all three branches of the armed services, and co-ordinates the annual five-power naval and air exercises, while moving towards the fuller integration of land elements. An annual FPDA Defence Chiefs' Conference (FDCC) is hosted by either Malaysia or Singapore, and is the highest military professional forum of the FPDA and serves as an important platform for dialogue and exchange of views among the Defence Chiefs.[3] There is also a Five Powers Defence Arrangements Ministerial Meeting (FDMM).[4]
John Moore, then Minister of Defence of Australia said, "As an established multilateral security framework, the FPDA has a unique role in Asia. It is of strategic benefit to all member nations and, in Australia's view, to the wider Asia-Pacific region."[5] Malaysia's CDF, former General (GEN) Tan Sri Dato' Sri Zulkifeli Bin Mohd Zin concurred: "We can help each other... and cooperate with one another."[6]
In the latest New Zealand defence White Paper released in June 2016, it was outlined that given New Zealand was a longstanding member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements, it would, "meet its commitments should Malaysia or Singapore be subject to a military attack."[7]

40th Anniversary[edit]

On 1 November 2011, Singapore hosted FPDA's 40th anniversary celebrations, with the defence ministers, aircraft and servicemen from all five signatory countries converging on Changi Air Base (East) to participate in the event. Later, a gala dinner was hosted by Singapore's defence minister - Dr Ng Eng Hen at Singapore's Istana whereupon they called on the Prime Minister of Singapore - Mr Lee Hsien Loong to discuss a multitude of issues. Codenamed Exercise Bersama Lima, the three days joint exercise is tested the readiness and co-operation between all participating countries and concluded on 4 November 2011.[8]

Personnel and facilities[edit]

The UK has the following personnel and facilities based in Malaysia and Singapore in support of the FPDA: a small Naval facility at Sembawang in Singapore operated by Joint Forces Command and staff in the Integrated Area Defence System Headquarters (HQ IADS) at RMAF Butterworth in PenangMalaysia. Staff at Sembawang total three Ministry of Defence civil servants, one Royal Engineer Warrant Officer , one Chief Petty Officer and one Petty officer (RN). The present UK Defence Adviser to Singapore as of 2015 is a Royal Navy Commander.[9] In HQ IADS, it is one Wing Commander, one Squadron Leader, one Lieutenant Commander, one Major and one other rank.[10]

References[edit]

Notes

Jump up^ "Malaysia: Military Alliances:Written question - 2257". Parliament of the United Kingdom. 11 June 2015. Retrieved 19 June 2015.
Jump up^ "Military Alliances: 4 Nov 2013: Hansard Written Answers". TheyWorkForYou. 4 November 2013. Retrieved 7 April 2014.
Jump up^ "News - Singapore Hosts 15th FPDA Defence Chiefs' Conference (07 Nov 13)" (Press release). MINDEF. Retrieved 7 April 2014.
Jump up^ "Military Alliances: 5 Nov 2013: HansardHansard Written Answers". TheyWorkForYou. 5 November 2013. Retrieved 7 April 2014.
Jump up^ "Media Release:Five Power Defence Meeting" (Press release). Defence Ministers & Parliamentary Secretary(Australia). 4 July 2000. Archived from the original on 2 February 2008. Retrieved 25 November 2007.
Jump up^ "Cyberpioneer - Five Power Defence Arrangements remain relevant (07 Nov 13)". Mindef.gov.sg. 7 November 2013. Retrieved 7 April 2014.
Jump up^ "Defence White Paper 2016" (PDF). The New Zealand Ministry of Defence Manatū Kaupapa Waonga. June 2016. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
Jump up^ "Singapore Hosts FPDA 40th Anniversary Celebrations" (Press release). Singaporean Ministry of Defence (MINDEF). 1 November 2011. Retrieved 2 November 2011.
Jump up^ "Mission Locator". mfa.gov.sg. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
Jump up^ "House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 17 Jun 2013 (pt 0002)". Publications.parliament.uk. Retrieved 7 April 2014.
External links[edit]
Five Power Defence Arrangements
The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain't Broke...

Saturday, October 8, 2016

Agong's "right and duty" to exercise his reserve powers "should never be in question"- Crt of Appeal & Federal Crt have explained why the Monarch can dismiss the PM

Comment
These relevant parts of the judgement of the Court of Appeal in the matter of Zambry v Nizar (the Perak Assembly case)  make clear that the Agong has the power to dismiss a sitting Prime Minitser:



As Blackstone defined it:- …The medieval King was doth Head of the Kingdom and feudal Lord. He had powers accounted for by the need to preserve the realm against external enemies and an undefined residual power which he might use for the public good…”.  Blackstone’s definition holds true too in (Malaysia).

The nine Rulers in the Malay States are indigenous Rulers and enjoyed their own prerogatives all along.....the traditional prerogatives of the Rulers remain and are buttressed by the Constitution of the respective States. In fact upon independence, our Constitution as drafted under the Chairmanship of Lord Reid, preserved and indeed enhanced the monarchy in Malaysia in several ways as seen in its provisions.
What is rarely displayed however, is the fact that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Rulers are seized with prerogative privileges and residual rights and powers. Some of which are expressed, others implied.

Unobtrusive as they may seem they are in fact omnipresent and their exercise may have far-reaching effect on the governance of the State. It must be stressed that the Royal Prerogative, discretionary and residual powers do not repose in the royal personages in vain. It is best expressed by Viscount Radcliffe
in Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 page 113 where His Lordship observed:- “… The essence of a prerogative power if one follows Locke’s thought, is not merely to administer the existing law – there is no need for any prerogative to execute the law – but to act for the public good where there is no law, or even to dispense with or override the law where the ultimate preservation of society is in question.”

 And similarly in the Malaysian context, it was observed by Lee Hun Hoe CJ (Borneo) in Government of Malaysia v Mahan Singh [1975] 2 MLJ 155 that:- “… The King is the first person in the nation – being superior to both Houses in dignity and the only branch of the Legislative that has a separate existence and is capable of performing any act at a time when Parliament is not in being.”

Following from that, it has to be said that, it is not at any time or any situation that this discretionary or prerogative power can be invoked. The general acceptance is that it has to be exercised judiciously.
It is clear that the Crown has a right and duty to protect its realm and citizens in times of war and peace and can invoke its prerogative to that end. That should never be in question.  

The above analysis, handed down by Zainur Ali CA on behalf of the Court of Appeal,  was upheld when the matter went on appeal to the Federal Court.

END



Even PM Najib accepts that there is nothing in law that prevents the Agong from sacking a sitting PM

by Ganesh Sahathevan

These are  the words of PM Najib with regards the Citizens' Declaration presented the Agong:

“In the meeting His Highness took notice of the matter that was brought up by Mahathir. However, the Agong explained to Mahathir that he cannot be involved in what Bersatu is doing.

“This is as the declaration made by Bersatu was not in accordance with the constitution. Any action should be in line with accepted practices via the parliament and electoral system for the rakyat to make their decision,”
The statement is interesting in that Najib sights "accepted practices" and not the Constitution or any other relevant law.In addition , he incorrectly declares the Bersatu declaration "not in accordance with the constitution", when it should be obvious even to him that there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal about anyone or group petitioning the Agong.

The matter of "accepted practices" or convention has been discussed before in a previous posting where it has been pointed out that convention in the Malay context demands that the limits of the Agong's powers be not questioned. Hence, Najib's reliance on convention rather than law in defence of his position is curious, to say the least.

END




Reference

Friday, October 7, 2016


Agong can sack a sitting PM, and Conference of Rulers can remove Agong when he fails to do so.



Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Tuanku Abdul Halim Mu’adzam Shah

by Ganesh Sahathevan

Given that Malaysia's Supreme Ruler or Yang DiPertuan Agong is elected every five years by the Conference of Rulers from among its members, it follows that it is the best interest of the sultans that no one person when elected as Agong act in any way that might be detrimental to their collective interest.

In fact, it does appear as if this right to protect , even defend, their collective interest is provided for in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia,which states in Article 38(6)(a):

The members of the Conference of Rulers may act in their discretion in any proceedings relating to the following functions, that is to say;
(a) the election or removal from office of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the election of the Timbalan Yang di-Pertuan Agong;

There does not appear to be any other provision in the Constitution that limits their discretion.

The 14th and current Yang di-Pertuan Agong , Sultan Abdul Halim of Kedah, faces a situation where the exercise of his Constitutional and reserve powers are under intense scrutiny given the 1MDB scandal that implicates his prime minister Najib Razak in theft, money laundering and various other criminal matters that are being investigated in a number of jurisdictions. At stake is the proper governance of his country, and he faces ongoing calls from his people to dismiss his prime minister who has entrenched himself using both political machinery and legislation.The latter has involved the introduction of the National Security Council Act ,which the Conference Of Rulers advised should not be passed without "refinement". In addition, the Agong has been presented with a petition containing 1.3 million signatures imploring him to act.It has been reported that he has refused to consider that petition.

The Agong's refusal has implications for future holders of that office and the Conference Of Rulers as a whole for he oversees both  an erosion of powers and a loss of confidence of  their subjects. 
That loss of confidence will lead to questions about the relevance of the institution of the sultanate ,and surely they must already realize that these questions are in fact being raised. The Conference Of Rulers is clearly in that situation where it has to consider removing the Agong, and perhaps his soon to be appointed successor should he persist  in his predecessor's behaviour, in order to preserve the institution of the sultanate, hereditary rule,and all the privileges that come with it. 

END 

See also 

Agong,Malay Rulers, And Their Powers To Dismiss A Sitting Prime Minister-More

NSC Act pits Chief Of Defence Forces against his Commander In Chief, The Agong-Might the Agong order the CDF be court-martialled?

Friday, October 7, 2016

Agong can sack a sitting PM, and Conference of Rulers can remove Agong when he fails to do so.



Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Tuanku Abdul Halim Mu’adzam Shah

by Ganesh Sahathevan

Given that Malaysia's Supreme Ruler or Yang DiPertuan Agong is elected every five years by the Conference of Rulers from among its members, it follows that it is the best interest of the sultans that no one person when elected as Agong act in any way that might be detrimental to their collective interest.

In fact, it does appear as if this right to protect , even defend, their collective interest is provided for in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia,which states in Article 38(6)(a):

The members of the Conference of Rulers may act in their discretion in any proceedings relating to the following functions, that is to say;
(a) the election or removal from office of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the election of the Timbalan Yang di-Pertuan Agong;

There does not appear to be any other provision in the Constitution that limits their discretion.

The 14th and current Yang di-Pertuan Agong , Sultan Abdul Halim of Kedah, faces a situation where the exercise of his Constitutional and reserve powers are under intense scrutiny given the 1MDB scandal that implicates his prime minister Najib Razak in theft, money laundering and various other criminal matters that are being investigated in a number of jurisdictions. At stake is the proper governance of his country, and he faces ongoing calls from his people to dismiss his prime minister who has entrenched himself using both political machinery and legislation.The latter has involved the introduction of the National Security Council Act ,which the Conference Of Rulers advised should not be passed without "refinement". In addition, the Agong has been presented with a petition containing 1.3 million signatures imploring him to act.It has been reported that he has refused to consider that petition.

The Agong's refusal has implications for future holders of that office and the Conference Of Rulers as a whole for he oversees both  an erosion of powers and a loss of confidence of  their subjects. 
That loss of confidence will lead to questions about the relevance of the institution of the sultanate ,and surely they must already realize that these questions are in fact being raised. The Conference Of Rulers is clearly in that situation where it has to consider removing the Agong, and perhaps his soon to be appointed successor should he persist  in his predecessor's behaviour, in order to preserve the institution of the sultanate, hereditary rule,and all the privileges that come with it. 

END 

See also 

Agong,Malay Rulers, And Their Powers To Dismiss A Sitting Prime Minister-More

NSC Act pits Chief Of Defence Forces against his Commander In Chief, The Agong-Might the Agong order the CDF be court-martialled?




Monday, September 26, 2016

Saudi Aramco IPO and the risk of revealing too much about not as much oil ............

by Ganesh Sahathevan




Forgotten in all the hype about the proposed Saudi Aramco IPO is the fact that an IPO requires disclosure of salient commercial issues.
To date, the Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia has kept secret the exact nature and extent of its oil reserves. The article below is one of many that have questioned the potential of its largest field, the super giant Ghawar. An IPO will mean answering the questions raised by this author and others.The Al-Sauds have refused to do so before, and have clearly not thought of the consequences an IPO will  have with regards disclosure of their reserves.
END






Here's Why You Don't Need Wikileaks To Know That Saudi Oil Reserves Are Overstated

Gail E. Tverberg|February 09, 2011|
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Saudi Arabia tells us that they have lots of oil, but if we look at graphs of their historical production, there is nothing that looks like an upward trend. In fact, recent production is lower than it was in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This is a graph of Saudi oil production, consumption, and amount of net exports, from Energy Exports Databrowser.
Exports, in green, are down because Saudi Arabia is consuming more and more of its own oil, so there is less available for others. This graph doesn't fit well with what we have been told.
The rest of the Middle East claims huge reserves, too, but looking at the Mideast in total doesn't give a much more favorable picture. While production is a bit higher in total now, exports (in green) are down from the 1970s because of rising consumption.






chart
It is almost certain that the Saudis are overstating their capabilities. The reserves for Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East are not audited, nor are their supposed "spare production capacities." They may have some spare capacity, but not the amount stated. When oil prices spiked to $147 barrel in July 2008, Saudi Arabia and others in the Middle East increased their production a bit, did not really come through with a huge surge in production, the way one would expect from their suppose spare capacity.
World oil supply has been roughly flat since 2005. Many are concerned that oil production will actually begin to fall in the next year or two - what is referred to as "peak oil" in the Wikileaks cable.
chart
Links to a Few Posts Relating to Overstatement of Saudi Reserves and Production Capability
The Oil Drum has published many posts over the years relating to Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East's likely inability to produce as much oil as they claim they can. These are excerpts from (or comments about) a few of them. Click on the titles to access the posts. You can access other posts by the same author by clicking on the person's name.
Euan explains why Middle East OPEC reserves are likely overstated, and shows this chart of likely reserves at the 2P (that is, expected) level:
chart
Comparison of official ME OPEC reserves with official reserves adjusted for production and pre-nationalistaion reserves figures adjusted for production. The arrow gives the likely range of 2P reserves.
Saudi Aramco has effectively used propaganda methods for at least the last fifteen years to convince many governments, corporations and individuals to believe their statements. However, Aramco’s statement that it is the world’s leading oil producer is now false as it now second after Russia since 2006. Nevertheless, Saudi Aramco’s repeated statement about remaining recoverable oil reserves being 260 billion barrels (Gb) is still generally accepted.


In 2004, Saudi Aramco stated that its oil initially in place (OIIP) has been growing steadily since 1982. There is considerable doubt about the validity of this increase, given the lack of new oil discoveries and the unusual nature of its steady continuous increase. Aramco stated the OIIP was 700 Gb at year end 2003 while a more realistic estimate is 580 Gb.
Aramco may have some high recovery factor fields such as Abqaiq and Shaybah, but an average recovery factor range from 30-37% is assumed for the total OIIP in Saudi Arabia’s fields. The trend of the recovery factor for Saudi Aramco indicates that there has been no effect on the recovery factor by recent technological advances in producing wells. Saudi Aramco has kept remaining recoverable crude oil reserves constant simply by artificially increasing the OIIP each year since 1982, accompanied by an unrealistically high average recovery factor of 52% since 1988.
Last night, on ABC's Nightline, Terry Moran interviewed President Bush in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during his trip to the Middle East. When discussing what President Bush might say to the King of Saudi Arabia to lower oil prices, George Bush said:
If they don't have a lot of additional oil to put on the market, it is hard to ask somebody to do something they may not be able to do.
We published a Press Release about this post, also.
This forecast for is on a broad basis (Crude and Condensate and Natural Gas Liquids) for Saudi Arabia.
chart
Forecast numbers are production capacity. Actual production may be lower depending upon demand.
5. Stuart Staniford -- Water in the Gas Tank--March 26, 2007


Forensic analysis regarding how the oil/water mix that is extracted seems to be changing to more water, less oil in Saudi Oil fields. The red portions of the bands are oil.
chart
Two cross sections of a reservoir simulation of the northern portion of the 'Ain Dar region of Ghawar at various years. Color represents volumetric water saturation in the rock pores. Source: Figure 9 of Alhuthali et al, Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper #93439, March 2005.
An attempt to understand depletion levels in Ghawar.
chart
Modeled distribution of original reserves in 'Ain Dar/Shedgum area of Ghawar(left), oil water contact offset by 511' vertically upward (center) and the same with the effect of gas caps (right).

Throughout the 2008 WEO, Saudi Arabia is cast in a leading role -- both figuratively:
On present trends, just to replace the oil reserves that will be exhausted and to meet the growth in demand, between now and 2030 we will need 64 mb/d of new oil-production capacity, six times the size of Saudi Arabia’s capacity today.
(from the Forward and Executive Summary)
and literally:
Saudi Arabia remains the world’s largest producer throughout the projection period, its output climbing from 10.2 mb/d in 2007 to 15.6 mb/d in 2030. (Executive Summary, page 40)
This post originally appeared at The Oil Drum.

http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-02-09/news/30097279_1_oil-production-peak-oil-historical-production